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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-
3(2)(i) of the Utah Code (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Susan's Petition for modification of alimony, both on a temporary 
basis and permanently, when the evidence established the 
following: 
1. Susan had sustained a substantial decrease in 
income due to a loss of employment. 
2. Susan showed a great need for alimony because her 
expenses greatly exceeded her unemployment income. 
3. David had the ability to pay additional alimony 
because of his substantial income. 
4. David was responsible, in part, for Susan's 
unstable employment situation because of his refusal to assist 
Susan in caring for the minor children and his constant 
harassment. 
5. During the course of the marriage, Susan had stayed 
home with the children and did not have the opportunity to 
develop a career, as did David. 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
Abuse of Discretion 
Authority: 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3 
1 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3) 
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 
Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 121 
(Utah 1990) 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 12 
(Ut. App. 1988) 
Ridae v. Ridge. 542 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1975) 
Harding v. Harding, 488 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1971) 
Curran v. Curranf 786 P.2d 205 
(Or. App. 1990) 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1983) 
Beckstead v., Beckstead, 663 P.2d 47 (Ut. 1983) 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (UT. 1987) 
B. Did the items set forth above in paragraph A(l-5) 
constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances 
sufficient to warrant a modification of the parties7 Divorce 
Decree respecting alimony? 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
Abuse of Discretion 
Authority; 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3) 
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 
Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 121 
(Utah 1990) 
Throckmorton v. Throckmortonr 767 P.2d 12 
(Ut. App. 1988) 
Ridge v. Ridge. 542 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1975) 
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Harding v. Harding. 488 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1971) 
Curran v. Curran, 786 P.2d 205 
(Or. App. 1990) 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1983) 
Beckstead v. Beckstead, 663 P.2d 47 (Ut. 1983) 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (UT. 1987) 
C. Did the Court err in denying Susan's Motion for 
Temporary Alimony, pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, when Susan was able to show her definite need as a 
result of her loss of employment and when David had the financial 
ability to pay the same? 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
Abuse of Discretion 
Authority; 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3 
Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration 
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 
Parish v. Parish. 84 Ut. 390, 35 P.2d 999 
(1934) 
Scott v. Scottr 105 Ut. 376, 142 P 2d 198 
(1943) 
Anderson v. Andersonf 13 Ut.2d 36, 
368 P.2d 264 (1962) 
Vignes v. Vignes, 311 So.2d 615 (La. App.) 
D. Was Susan entitled to obtain a temporary increase in 
alimony pending a final hearing on her Petition for Modification of 
the Divorce Decree? 
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Standard of Review: 
Abuse of Discretion 
Authority; 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-3 
Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration 
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 
Parish v. Parish. 84 Ut. 390, 35 P.2d 999 
(1934) 
Scott v. Scott. 105 Ut. 376, 142 P.2d 198 
(1943) 
Anderson v. Anderson. 13 Ut.2d 36, 
368 P.2d 244 (1962) 
Vianes v. Vianes. 311 So.2d 615 (La. App.) 
E. Did the Court err in refusing to award Susan her 
attorney fees? 
Standard of Review; 
Abuse of Discretion 
Authority: 
Whitehead v. Whitehead. 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(Aug. 7, 1992) 
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STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann. 
Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay 
to the clerk a sum of money for the separate 
support and maintenance of the adverse party 
and the children, and to enable such party to 
prosecute and defend the action. 
Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Ann. 
See addendum 
Rule 6-404, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
See addendum 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
This appeal is from a final order rendered by the 
Honorable David S. Young on March 3, 1992 in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah which 
denied Susan's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and an 
associated Motion for Temporary Relief. 
The parties to this action were divorced by a decree 
entered by the lower court on November 30, 1992. As a part of the 
decree, Susan was awarded alimony in the amount of $1.00 per year. 
On August 26, 1991, Susan filed a petition to modify the parties 
divorce decree to increase her alimony award because she had lost 
her job three months earlier. In order to obtain financial 
assistance pending a resolution of her petition, Susan also filed 
a Motion for temporary child support and alimony. A hearing on 
Susan's Motion was heard before Commissioner Michael Evans on 
September 10, 1991 and the motion was denied. Commissioner Evans 
ruled that Susan's request for temporary alimony "constitutes a 
modification of the original decree of divorce in violation of Rule 
6-404, Rules of Judicial Administration, and cannot be dealt with 
on the law and motion calendar". Susan filed an objection to the 
Commissioner's recommendation on September 20, 1991 and the 
objection was reviewed by Judge David S. Young. Judge Young, in a 
ruling entered on October 23, 1991, denied Susan's objections and 
upheld the Commissioner's refusal to award temporary alimony. 
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On January 6, 1992, a Pre-trial Conference was held 
before Commissioner Sandra Peuler and the case was certified for 
trial. Trial was held before the Honorable David S. Young on 
February 11, 1992 at 2:00 p.m.• After hearing the evidence, Judge 
Young ruled that although Susan had shown a substantial change in 
circumstances because of her loss of job, both parties were able to 
earn sufficient amounts of income to meet their needs and 
obligations. Judge Young subsequently dismissed the Plaintiff's 
Petition on David's motion. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties to this action were married on October 
29, 1966. At the time of the parties' marriage, Susan was 20 years 
old and had not yet finished her college education. Subsequently, 
three children were born to the parties and one child was adopted. 
Susan provided the majority of the day to day care for the 
children. (Transcript p. 10, 11, 33; Record p. 380). 
2. 1. The parties to this action were divorced on 
November 30, 1982, after 16 years of marriage. (Record p. 132 -
135). 
3. Pursuant to the parties' Divorce Decree, Susan was 
awarded, among other things, custody of the parties' three minor 
children, together with alimony in the amount of $1 per year. 
(Record p. 132 - 135). 
4. At the time of the divorce, Susan was employed and 
earning approximately $12,000.00 per year. David was employed by 
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Unisys and was earning between $42-43 Thousand Dollars per year. 
(Transcript p. 15). 
5. After the divorce, Susan did her best to develop a 
career so that she could adequately care for herself and the 
children. In doing so, Susan was employed by several different 
firms but had trouble maintaining employment because of her lack of 
seniority. She also had a difficult time maintaining stable 
employment because her employment frequently required her to travel 
out of town. This was very difficult while trying to raise three 
children and was aggravated by the fact that Mr. Wells would not 
assist Susan in caring for the children during such periods. A 
brief summary of Susan's employment since the divorce is set forth 
as follows: 
A. At the time of the divorce, Susan was employed by 
Beckton Dickenson Company in Salt Lake City. Susan was laid off in 
1984 after Beckton Dickenson closed its Salt Lake division. 
(Transcript p. 15, 16). 
B. Susan was thereafter hired by Wicat Systems and was 
laid off in November of 1984 due to a one-third reduction in work 
force. (Transcript p. 17). 
C. Susan was thereafter hired by Hercules until December 
of 1986. Her employment was terminated because of a mass employee 
layoff and her low seniority. (Transcript p. 17). 
D. From 1987 through June of 1989, Susan worked for 
Morton Thiokol. During this time, Susan's job required that she 
travel out of state on an average of twice per month for 3-5 days 
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each trip. While Susan was away on one such trip, the parties son 
was involved in a car accident. Rather than helping Susan during 
this stressful time, David filed charges with the Department of 
Social Services alleging that Susan was an unfit mother. In 
addition, David was very rude to Shannon Ledezma who was caring for 
the children. Even though his charges were dismissed by Social 
Services, David's actions created enormous stress for Susan. At 
the time of trial, Judge Young commented that David's actions of 
engaging the Department of Social Services "was completely 
irresponsible and should not have occurred....and I think your 
approach to Ms. Ledezma was irresponsible and inappropriate". 
Because of David's harassment and the stress resulting from her 
travel, Susan left Thiokol in June of 1989. (Transcript p. 18 -
23; 45 - 49, 63 - 64). 
E. After Thiokol, Susan obtained employment with Futura 
Company on September 10, 1990. Susan left Futura because of sexual 
harassment from her boss. On January 21, 1991, Susan joined EDO 
Corporation. Due to government cut backs and financial problems, 
Susan was laid off on May 24, 1991. (Transcript p. 24 - 25). 
4. At the time of her layoff from EDO Corporation, Susan 
was earning a gross monthly income of $3083. After her 
termination, Susan received an income of approximately $212 per 
week from unemployment benefits. During the period of her 
unemployment, Susan incurred substantial debts and obligations, 
including a mortgage arrearage of $6176.00. Her car was also 
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repossessed leaving a deficiency of $3,600.00. (Transcript 25 -
30, 37, 34, 35; Record p. 383, 384; Exhibit 2-P) 
5. At the time of trial, David had a gross income of 
$67,200.00 per year. (Transcript p. 56) 
6. On or about August 22, 1991, after three months of 
unemployment, Susan filed a Petition for Modification of the 
Divorce Decree and requested that David's obligation to pay alimony 
be increased to assist her in meeting her monthly expenses. Susan 
also requested that the Court grant an amount of temporary alimony 
pending a final hearing on her Petition. The Court denied her 
request for temporary alimony. The Court ruled that the temporary 
relief sought "constitutes a modification of the original decree of 
divorce in violation of 6-404, Rules of Judicial Administration, 
and cannot be dealt with on the Law and Motion calendar". (Record 
p. 304 - 314, 315 - 322, 327) 
7. On January 20, 1992, Susan was hired by WINCO -
(Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company), after being unemployed for 
approximately eight months, at a salary of $3000.00 per month. Her 
employer is located in Idaho Falls, Idaho* Because of the distance 
from her home, Susan was forced to rent a small home in Idaho for 
$560.00 per month, in addition to maintaining her Utah home. 
(Transcript p. 8,9, 29, 30; Exhibit P-l)„ 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower court's dismissal of Susan's Petition for 
modification and related orders was in error for the following 
reasons: 
1. Susan was entitled to temporary relief. Rule 6-404 
of the Rules of Judicial Administration does not prevent an award 
of temporary alimony pending the prosecution of a Petition to 
Modify. Rather, the Court has broad equitable powers to make such 
an award pursuant to Sections 30-3-3 and 30-3-5(3) of the Utah 
Code. 
2. The Trial Court Improperly Denied Susan's Petition. 
The trial court improperly denied Susan's Petition for the 
following reasons: 
A. The award of $1.00 per year alimony in the original 
divorce decree was designed to assist Susan in difficult times, 
such as the loss of a job. 
B. Susan was entitled to an award of alimony because she 
had serious financial needs, had the inability to produce 
sufficient income to pay her bills, and because David had 
sufficient resources to pay the same. 
C. Susan's loss of a job provided a change of 
circumstances sufficient to support a modification of the divorce 
decree. 
D. The fact that Susan became employed one month prior 
to trial should not preclude a modification of alimony. 
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3. Attorney Fees: At the time of trial, Susan showed 
that she had a definite need for her attorney fees to be paid, that 
David had adequate means to pay the same, and that the fees 
incurred were reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
This case presents two major questions which beg a 
resolution by the Court. First, can the court grant a party who is 
seeking a modification of a divorce decree temporary relief while 
the petition is being prosecuted? If temporary relief cannot be 
granted, a reduction of income due to a job loss places the obligee 
spouse in a very untenable position - that of waiting for a final 
decision on the Petition before obtaining the necessary relief. 
Until such time, the Obligee spouse must go without, all during the 
time relief is critically needed. In the instant case, Susan Wells 
was required to wait for over 8 months, even though she had 
desperate needs. 
Second, when can a $1.00 per year alimony award be 
modified, and is unemployment for an extended period sufficient 
cause? 
For the following reasons, the trial Court abused its 
discretion by denying Susan temporary relief when it was critically 
needed and for ignoring her financial needs resulting from a job 
loss. 
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A. SUSAN WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF TEMPORARY ALIMONY* 
The Court, in denying Susan an award of temporary 
alimony, ruled that her request "constitutes a modification of the 
original decree of divorce in violation of 6-404, Rules of Judicial 
Administration, and cannot be dealt with on the law and motion 
calendar". The Court's ruling was in error, and should be reversed 
for the following reasons: 
First, the provisions of the Utah Code provide the Court 
with substantial equitable powers to provide for the support and 
maintenance of parties in divorce matters, both before granting 
the divorce and after. Section 30-3-5(3) of the Code provides that 
"the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes 
or new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties... as 
is reasonable and necessary" (emphasis added). 
In addition, Section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code authorizes the 
Court to make awards of temporary alimony. Section 30-3-3 
provides: "The Court may order either party to pay the clerk a sum 
of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse 
party and the children, and to enable such party to prosecute or 
defend the action". Although the statute doesn't expressly state 
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that the "temporary order" provisions of Section 30-3-3 apply to 
petitions for modification, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted 
the statute as applying to both original cases and petitions to 
modify. Anderson v. Andersonf 368 P.2d 264 (Utah 1962); Mauahn v. 
Mauahn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah 1989). 
Second, Susan's motion for temporary relief was not prohibited 
by Rule 6-404 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. Rule 6-404 
provides, in pertinent part: 
...(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree 
shall be commenced by the filing of a petition 
to modify in the original divorce action. 
Service of the petition and summons upon the 
opposing party shall be in accordance with the 
requirements of rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. No request for a 
modification of an existing decree shall be 
raised by way of an order to show cause. 
Susan's Motion for Temporary Alimony is not a request to 
modify the Divorce Decree prior to a hearing on the Plaintiff's 
Petition. Rather, Susan simply filed her motion pursuant to §30-3-
3 of the Utah Code and requested that the court use its equitable 
powers and award her temporary alimony so that she could adequately 
prosecute her case and maintain her obligations. 
In the instant case, Susan's Motion for Temporary Alimony was 
properly before the Court and should have been granted. As set 
forth in the Statement of Facts, Susan's income had been lowered 
substantially because she had lost her job. At the time of filing 
her motion, she had been unemployed for three months and did not 
have any prospects for employment in the foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, Susan showed that she was in danger of losing her home 
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and that David had sufficient income to provide assistance. 
Because of her great needs and David's ability to pay, the Court 
abused its discretion in not awarding temporary support. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING SUSAN'S 
PETITION 
Susan's appeal in this case concerns the practical 
application of the often used clause in divorce cases which 
reserves alimony to a spouse in the amount of $1.00 per year. Such 
a clause is generally utilized to give the receiving spouse the 
opportunity to seek a modification of the award if a need arises in 
the future. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Ut. 1987). At 
the time of the divorce, such an award was certainly warranted in 
Susan's favor because of the following: 
1. The parties had been married for 16 years. 
2. At the time of their marriage, Susan was only twenty 
years old and had not finished her education. 
3. Three children were born to the parties during the 
marriage and another adopted, and Susan had been the primary 
caretaker. Because she stayed home with the children, David was 
able to develop his career and was in a financially superior 
position at the time of the divorce. 
In order to obtain a modification of her alimony award, 
Susan must first show that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances since the entry of divorce. This requirement, as 
found by Judge Young, was established by Susan's loss of 
employment. In ruling on this case, Judge Young stated that "... 
I think the Court would be obligated to find that there has been a 
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change of circumstance just simply by the fact of unemployment and 
then re-employment and those kinds of events occurring in Ms. Wells 
life,..." (Transcript p. 60). Judge Young's finding of a "change 
in circumstances" is supported by substantial authority that a loss 
of employment can provide the basis for a modification. 
In Throckmorton v. ThrockmortonP 767 P.2d 121 (Ut. App. 
1988), the Utah Appellate Court increased an alimony award from $1 
per year to $396 per month in favor of Mrs. Throckmorton because 
she was no longer receiving child support payments for the children 
and was unemployed due to a serious medical condition. The Court 
affirmed the trial Court's finding of a substantial change of 
circumstances justifying a modification of the alimony provision 
based upon the above factors. 
In the case of Ridae v. Ridaer 542 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1975) , the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial Court's modification of an 
alimony award based upon the husband's reduction of income from 
$3200 per year to $2300. A similar ruling was upheld in Harding v. 
Harding, 488 P.2d 308 (Ut. 1971), in which an alimony award was 
reduced because of a reduction of income sustained by the husband 
due to a transfer of employment. 
The case law in the State of Oregon is similar. In the 
case of Curran v. Curran, 786 P.2d 205 (Or. App. 1990), the Court 
found that the ex-husband's loss of a teaching position constituted 
a substantial change in circumstances warranting a reduction in 
alimony from $400 per month to $50 per month. 
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Having found a substantial change in circumstances, the 
Court must then determine whether an increase in alimony is 
warranted. This is done by analyzing the following factors: (1) 
The financial condition and needs of the spouse; (2) The ability 
of the spouse to produce sufficient income for herself; and (3) the 
ability of the paying spouse to provide support. Jones v. JonesP 
700 P. 2d 1072, 1079 (Utah 1985); Paffel v. Paf fel, 732 P.2d 96 
(Utah 1986). 
In the instant case, the three prong test has been 
satisfied in Susan's favor. First, Susan has shown a definite need 
for assistance. During the eight months that she was unemployed, 
Susan incurred an arrearage of over $6,000.00 on her home, had her 
car repossessed and incurred a deficiency of $3,600.00, and fell 
behind in other obligations. Second, Susan did her best to obtain 
sufficient income for her needs. There is no evidence that she was 
voluntarily unemployed or that she had any employment options. Her 
only source of income consisted of unemployment compensation and 
child support. Finally, David was well positioned to pay Susan 
alimony. At the time of trial, David's gross annual income was 
$67,200.00. Because Susan had met all of the requirements of the 
three prong test, the Court improperly denied her an increase of 
alimony. 
Even though Susan was entitled to an increase of alimony 
pursuant to the three prong test, the Court, in its ruling, 
inferred that Susan's subsequent employment in January of 1992 made 
her ineligible for a modification of the decree. There is no 
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authority to support this conclusion and equity dictates otherwise. 
The fact that Susan had been re-employed after 8 months of 
unemployment did not mean that she was without financial need. The 
evidence at trial showed that Susan had substantial obligations and 
arrears because of her extended unemployment. The mere fact that 
Susan had obtained a job did not instantly change her financial 
position. Furthermore, the Court could have increased her alimony 
only during the time that Susan was unemployed. Such a 
modification did not have to extend indefinitely. Such an order 
would be equitable in this case because of the unequal earning 
capacities of the parties. 
In addition, the denial of Susan's petition because of 
re-employment would penalize her for attempting to improve her 
situation. As a practical matter, a petition for modification 
generally takes several months to come to trial. Although Susan's 
employment is certainly a factor to consider when determining the 
extent of her financial condition, it should not be a reason to 
deny her petition outright without examining the financial status 
of the parties. As set forth above, Susan had acquired a large 
amount of debt during her unemployment and her financial condition 
remained in a poor state because of accumulated debt. 
Finally, if the dismissal of Susan's Petition is upheld, 
the "$1.00 per year" alimony clause in Susan's decree will be 
rendered meaningless. Even though the divorce was granted several 
years ago, Susan has never been able to catch up with David in 
terms of income and job stability. Her sacrifices for David and 
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the children during the marriage and thereafter have put her at a 
distinct financial disadvantage. The alimony clause was designed 
to assist Susan through the same type of problems that caused her 
to file her petition for modification. To do otherwise makes a 
mockery of the decree and is not equitable. 
C, SUSAN SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES 
The decision as to whether to award attorney fees is in 
the sole discretion of the Court. Crouse v. Grouse. 817 P.2d 836, 
840 (Utah App. 1991). In making such an award, the Court must 
consider the "financial needs of the receiving spouse, the ability 
of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees." Whitehead v. Whitehead. 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Aug. 7, 
1992). 
In the instant case, the court abused its discretion by 
failing to take into account Susan's disadvantaged financial 
condition and David's ability to pay. Furthermore, there was no 
objection to the amount requested. For these reasons, Susan's 
request for an award of attorney fees was improperly denied and 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In her petition, subsequent memoranda, and the evidence 
adduced at trial, Susan has established the following: First, she 
has shown a substantial change in circumstances respecting her 
employment and income since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
Second, she has shown a great and immediate financial need for 
assistance from David. Finally, she has shown that David had 
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sufficient assets and financial means to assist her. Because of 
the above, the court should reverse the trial courts dismissal of 
her Petition and request for temporary relief and remand for the 
entry of an award of alimony and attorney fees commensurate with 
her needs. 
DATED this / v' day of December, 1992. 
J^MES B. HANKS 
:torney for Susan Wells 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief was mailed, postage prepaid on the / (f'J day of 
December, 1992, to the following: 
PETER W. GUYON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Commissioner's Recomendation Denying Motion for Temporary 
Alimony. 
B. Order Affirming Commissioner's Recomendation. 
C. Order Denying Temporary Alimony. 
D. Order Denying Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. 
E. Transcript of Judge Young's Findings. 
F. U.C.A. 30-3-5(3). 
G. Rule 6-404, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WELLS, SUSAN ANNE 
VS 
WELLS, DAVID JOHN 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 814902737 DA 
DATE 09/10/91 
HONORABLE MICHAEL S. EVANS 
COURT REPORTER TAPE-1-7:37-15:19 
COURT CLERK CPW 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. HANKS, JAMES B. 
D. ATTY. GUYON, PETER W. 
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS: 
1. REGARDING ALIMONY: SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF TIME HAS PASSED & 
PARTIES HAVE SUPPORTED THEMSELVES. REQUEST FOR TEMP. ALIMONY 
DENIED PURSUANT TO 6-404. PLTF ASKING COURT TO MAKE A DE-
TERMINATION THAT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES HAS OC-
CURRED. COURT MUST MAKE DETERMINATION THAT CHANGE HAS OC-
CURRED & CANNOT DO SO ON LAW & MOTION CALENDAR. 
MR. GUYON PREPARE ORDER. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WELLS, SUSAN ANNE 
VS 
WELLS, DAVID JOHN 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 814902737 DA 
DATE 10/23/91 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. HANKS, JAMES B. 
D. ATTY. GUYON, PETER W. 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO THE COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION 
AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ARE EACH DENIED. MR. GUYON IS 
TO PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT HEREWITH. 
C.C. TO COUNSEL 
— . i i 
Third Judicial Oist 
NOV 0 8 1991 
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Peter W. Guyon (1285) 
Attorney for Defendant 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-5555 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
•--oooOooo 
SUSAN ANNE WELLS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID JOHN WELLS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT 
AND ALIMONY 
Civil No. D-81-2737 
Judge: David S. Young 
oooOooo— 
On t h e 10th day of S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 9 1 , PLAINTIFF'S 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY was heard 
b e f o r e Commiss ione r M i c h a e l S. Evans , and came P l a i n t i f f in 
p e r s o n and by and t h r o u g h c o u n s e l James B. Hanks and came 
Defendant in person and by and through counsel Pe t e r W. Guyon and 
the Commissioner, having reviewed the documentat ion submit ted by 
both p a r t i e s , having l i s t e n e d t o arguments and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of 
c o u n s e l and b e i n g f u l l y a d v i s e d , and h a v i n g recommended t h a t 
P l a i n t i f f ' s m o t i o n be d e n i e d as v i o l a t i v e of 6 -404 , Rules of 
J u d i c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and P l a i n t i f f h a v i n g o b j e c t e d t o t h e 
Commissioner 's recommendation and having r eques t ed o r a l argument 
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thereon, and both parties having submitted memoranda in support 
of their respective positions, it is 
ORDERED that Plaintiff's objections to the 
Commissioner's recommendation and request for oral argument are 
both denied; and it is 
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's VERIFIED MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY be, and the same hereby is, 
denied. 
DATED this/Y day of N06(^^(^f^^_ 1991 
THE COURT 
D i s t r i c t Jkdg 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The u n d e r s i g n e d c e r t i f i e s t h a t on t h e d a t e below a 
t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY was 
mailed wi th a l l f i r s t - c l a s s pos tage prepa id t o : 
James B. Hanks, Esq. 
Kipp And Christian P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2314 
DATED this &fi day of Y^fcX/U**^-- 1991. 
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JAMES B. HANKS (A4331) 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN ANNE WELLS, : ORDER DENYING PETITION 
TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
Civil No- D-81-2737 
DAVID JOHN WELLS, 
Defendant. : 
On the 11th day of February, 1992, Plaintiff's Petition 
for Modification of Divorce Decree was heard before the Honorable 
David S. Young. The Plaintiff's was present and represented by her 
attorney, James B. Hanks of Kipp and Christian, P.C. The Defendant 
was present and represented by his attorney, Peter W. Guyon. The 
Court, having heard the testimony presented by Plaintiff finds that 
the Plaintiff has not shown a substantial change in circumstances 
warranting a modification of the parties' divorce decree with 
respect to alimony. The Plaintiff has the ability to support 
herself and an increase of the amount of alimony would be improper 
at this time. Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby orders as 
follows: 
MAR 0 3 1992 
W^efcoUNTY 
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1. That Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Divorce 
Decree be, and hereby is, denied. 
2. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the following 
provisions shall bind both the parties insofar as medical and 
dental expenses for any minor children are concerned: 
A. The custodial parent shall pay uninsured, routine 
medical and dental expenses, including routine office visits, 
physical examinations and immunizations; and 
B. Both parents shall share all other reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical and dental expenses equally. 
3. Both parties shall pay their own attorney fees and 
costs necessitated by these proceedings. 
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1 IN THE SUMMER OF 1990 SHE WAS EARNING $*t0, 000.00 A YEAR. 
2 IN MAY OF 1991 SHE LOST HER JOB, SHE DIDN'T HAVE AN INCOME. 
3 SO AGAIN WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
4 I THINK SHE'S MORE THAN MET HER BURDEN, YOUR 
5 HONOR, AND I ASK THAT THEIR MOTION BE DENIED. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU DESIRE TO FURTHER RESPOND, 
7 MR. GUYON? 
8 I MR. GUYON: NO, I'LL SUBMIT THAT. WELL, CAN 
9 I TAKE THAT BACK? 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: YES, YOU MAY, IF YOU WISH TO SAY 
11 SOMETHING FURTHER. 
12 MR. GUYON: JUST ONE THING, JUDGE, AND THAT IS 
13 THAT THE—I THINK IT'S A PART OF THE RECORD, AND THERE WERE 
14 —WELL, I THINK THAT'S INAPPROPRIATE. I SHOULD HAVE CROSS-
15 EXAMINED ON THAT. I WITHDRAW THAT. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I HAVE REVIEWED THE 
17 FACTS THAT YOU PRESENT, MR. HANKS, AND THE—I THINK THE 
18 COURT WOULD BE OBLIGATED TO FIND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE! 
19 OF CIRCUMSTANCE JUST SIMPLY BY THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
20 AND THEN RE-EMPLOYMENT AND THOSE KINDS OF EVENTS OCCURRING 
21 IN MS. WELLS' LIFE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME I DO BELIEVE THAT 
22 THERE IS NO ESTABLISHMENT OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY 
23 A CHANGE IN REQUIRING ALIMONY BE PAID. 
24 IN FACT, IT STRIKES ME THAT UNDER THE CIRCUM-
25 STANCES OF THIS CASE BOTH OF THESE PARTIES ARE UNIQUELY 
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1 ABLE TO EARN SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF MONEY TO MEET THEIR 
2 NEEDS AND OBLIGATIONS. HER EMPLOYMENT HAS BEEN 1*0,000, 
3 IS NOW 30,000. THERE ARE DECISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THAT 
4 EMPLOYMENT THAT SHE MUST MAKE AS TO WHETHER SHE IS GOING 
5 TO RESIDE IN UTAH, IN LAYTON, OR WHETHER SHE'S GOING TO 
6 MOVE TO IDAHO FALLS WHERE THE JOB IS, HER FAMILY, HER CIRCUM-
7 STANCES, HER CHILDREN, JUSTIFY THE MOVE TO IDAHO FALLS. 
8 THE DETERMINATION TO LEAVE THE JOB BECAUSE SHE WAS DISSAT-
9 ISFIED WITH THE TRAVEL CHALLENGES, THOSE ARE ALL DECISIONS 
10 THAT EVERYBODY HAS TO MAKE IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF THEIR 
11 LIFE. 
12 I DON'T SEE THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
13 HAVE ESTABLISHED A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE COURT TO CONCLUDE! 
14 THAT I OUGHT TO DO ANYTHING WITH THE ALIMONY. AS A MATTER 
15 OF FACT, I HAVE SOME BASIC CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROTECTION 
16 OF THE ONE-YEAR, OR THE $1.00 PER YEAR PROVISION UNDER THE 
17 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES ARE ABLE-
18 BODIED PERSONS AND ABLE TO EARN INCOME. AND IT SEEMS TO 
19 ME THAT THAT PREFERENCE OF PRESERVING THAT AGAINST THE 
20 PROTECTION THAT THE SAME KIND OF THING MAY HAPPEN TO THE 
21 HUSBAND, HE COULD BECOME SUDDENLY UNEMPLOYED OR LOSE HIS 
22 JOB FOR THE SAME KINDS OF REASONS THAT SHE DID, WOULD YET 
23 DENY HIM ANY PROTECTION WHATSOEVER UNDER THE PRESENT STATUS 
24 I OF THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
SO BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY THAT I'VE HEARD, 
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1 THE PRESENTATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED HERE, THE COURT 
2 FINDS THAT THE PETITION TO MODIFY SHOULD BE AND THE SAME 
3 IS HEREBY DENIED. 
4 I FURTHER FIND THAT EACH PARTY SHOULD BE ORDERED 
5 TO PAY THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AS 
6 THEY'VE INCURRED THEM. 
7 MR. GUYON, I'LL ASK YOU TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
8 MR. HANKS: JUDGE, ONE MATTER. YOUR HONOR, WE 
9 HAD AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A MODIFICATION TO ALLOW BOTH 
10 SIDES TO PAY ONE-HALF OF UNCOVERED MEDICAL BILLS. I BELIEVE 
11 THAT WAS STIPULATED TO, YOUR HONOR. 
12 I MR. GUYON: THAT'S CORRECT, JUDGE. 
13 JUDGE YOUNG: AND THAT SHOULD BE AGREED UPON. 
14 MR. GUYON: I WILL PUT THAT IN THE ORDER. 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT NEEDS 
16 TO B E — 
17 MR. HANKS: YOUR HONOR, MY CLIENT HAS BEEN CON-
18 CERNED THAT ALL THE FACTS BE HEARD, AND IF THE COURT WOULD 
19 INDULGE ME, SHE HAS BEEN CONCERNED SINCE THE DIVORCE THAT 
20 SHE HAS TRIED TO GET OUT AND EARN AN INCOME BUT THE PROBLEM 
21 SHE'S HAD IS BECAUSE OF HER LACK OF SENIORITY. SHE'S HAD 
22 A HARD TIME GETTING BACK IN THE WORK PLACE. IT SEEMS LIKE 
23 EVERY TIME SHE GETS A FOOT IN THE DOOR THERE'S A REDUCTION 
24 IN THE WORK FORCE AND SHE'S LAID OFF AGAIN. AND I GUESS 
25 OUR CONCERN IS THAT MR. WELLS, ON THE OTHER HAND, DIDN'T 
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HAVE TO STAY HOME WITH THE KIDS, HAD A CHANCE TO DEVELOP 
A CAREER AND HE IS IN A TOTALLY DIFFERENT POSITION. HE 
IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGED BECAUSE OF THAT, WHERE SHE MADE 
SACRIFICES, STAYED HOME WITH THE KIDS, NOW SHE HAS TO GET 
OUT, DEVELOP A CAREER AND IT'S JUST BEEN VERY, VERY DIFFI-
CULT FOR HER, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T DOUBT THAT IT'S BEEN DIFFI-
CULT. AND SHE'S MADE SOME CHOICES IN THAT REGARD. I SUS-
PECT THAT WHILE THEY MAY NOT BE MEASURED ECONOMICALLY THERE 
WOULD BE RELATIONSHIPS THAT COULD BE, THAT HAVE BEEN GEN-
ERATED BETWEEN THE MOTHER AND THE CHILDREN THAT ARE PROBABLY 
VERY DIFFERENT THAN THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT HAVE BEEN PRE-
SENTED TO THE FATHER BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE MOTHER 
HAS LIVED WITH THE CHILDREN. AND THE CONFLICTS THAT THESE 
PARENTS HAVE HAD BETWEEN THEMSELVES—I WILL SAY THAT FROM 
EVERYTHING THAT I'VE BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE IN RELATION TO 
THE ACCIDENT TO THE YOUNGEST CHILD, THAT THE REPORT BY MR. 
WELLS TO SOCIAL SERVICES AND OTHERS, TO ENGAGE THEM IN 
INVOLVEMENT IN THIS WAS COMPLETELY IRRESPONSIBLE AND SHOULD 
NOT HAVE OCCURRED. BUT WHO KNOWS WHAT WE EACH MIGHT DO 
IN THE EMOTION AND TRAGEDY OF OUR SON BEING HIT BY AN AUTO-
MOBILE. SO I THINK THESE PARTIES HAVE SHOWN REMARKABLE 
IMMATURITY IN SOME OF THE THINGS THAT THEY HAVE DONE. AND 
I WILL TELL YOU THAT CANDIDLY, MR. WELLS, FACE TO FACE. 
I THINK THAT WAS IRRESPONSIBLE OF YOU. AND I THINK YOUR 
63 
•33 
1 APPROACH TO MS. LEDEZMA WAS IRRESPONSIBLE AND INAPPROPRIATE. 
2 I WOULD HOPE THAT IN THE FUTURE THOSE KINDS OF THINGS OUGHT 
3 NOT TO OCCUR. 
4 BUT IN ANY EVENT, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE FACT 
5 THAT SHE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP SENIORITY, THOSE CIRCUMH 
6 STANCES ARE NO DIFFERENT THAN AN AWFUL LOT OF OTHER PEOPLE. 
7 SHE NOW HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE EMPLOYED AT $30,000.00 
8 A YEAR, AND THAT'S MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN PROBABLY 60 PERCENT 
9 OF OUR POPULATION, IF NOT MORE. AND THAT, TO ME, IS ADEQUATE] 
10 INCOME TO MEET HER NEEDS. 
11 SO, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU DESIRE FOR THE 
12 RECORD? 
13 I MR. HANKS: NO, YOUR HONOR, I THINK--
14 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. MR. GUYON, IF YOU WILL 
15 PREPARE THE ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THE RULING OF THE COURT 
16 AND PRESENT THEM TO MR. HANKS FOR APPROVAL AS TO FORM. 
17 COURT'S IN RECESS. 
18 MR. HANKS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
19 MR. GUYON: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
20 (WHEREUPON, THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED) 
21 
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(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived sepa-
atelv under a decree of separate maintenance of 
r
 y state for three consecutive years without co-
habitation. 
U) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection 
rttfi) does not affect the liability of either party under 
(J
'
U
 provision for separate maintenance previously 
^(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the 
grounds of insanity unless: (i) the defendant has 
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authori-
ties of this or another state prior to the com-
mencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds 
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the 
insanity of the defendant is incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a 
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests 
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and 
complaint shall be served on the defendant in 
person or by publication, as provided by the laws 
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon 
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attor-
ney for the county where the action is prosecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the 
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out 
of this state, take depositions as necessary, at-
tend the proceedings, and make a defense as is 
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the 
interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have ju-
risdiction over the payment of alimony, the dis-
tribution of property, and the custody and main-
tenance of minor children, as the courts and 
judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the de-
fendant resides in this state, upon notice, have 
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or 
have an examination of the defendant by two or 
more competent physicians, to determine the 
mental condition of the defendant For this pur-
pose either party may have leave from the court 
to enter any asylum or institution where the de-
fendant may be confined. The costs of court in 
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from 
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner 
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband. 
1953 
30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk 
a sum of money for the separate support and mainte-
nance of the adverse party and the children, and to 
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action. 
1953 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Seal-
ing. 
U) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and 
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted 
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evi-
dence taken in the cause. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a 
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an 
action in the judicial district as defined in Sec-
tion 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be 
administered, a decree of divorce may not be 
granted until both parties have attended a man-
datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and 
have presented a certificate of course completion 
to the court. The court may waive this require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one 
of the parties, if it determines course attendance 
and completion are not necessary, appropriate, 
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties, 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be 
held before the court or the court commissioner 
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner 
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings 
and decree upon the evidence. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be 
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either 
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned 
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a 
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Re-
covery Services if a party to the proceedings has ap-
plied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court 
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does 
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend 
the decree. 1992 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children 
— Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children; 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
2? 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall 
consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child cus-
tody or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the pre-
vailing party in tha t action, if the court determines 
tha t the petition was without merit and not asserted 
in good faith. 1991 
30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in 
child support order. 
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, 
it shall include in the order a provision for withhold-
ing income as a means of collecting child support as 
provided in Title 78, Chapter 45d. 1985 
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sex-
ual abuse — Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request 
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of 
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating 
either party, the court shall order that an investiga-
tion be conducted by the Division of Family Services 
within the Department of Human Services in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 4, Part 5. A final 
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered 
until a report on that investigation is received by the 
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the 
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the 
court's notice and request for an investigation. In re-
viewing this report, the court shall comply with Sec-
tion 78-7-9. 1992 
30-3-5.5. Petition to protect abused child — Ju-
risdiction under this chapter. 
( D A person who has filed a complaint under this 
chapter may also file a petition with the district court 
for a protective order for the protection of any chil-
dren residing with either party to the action under 
this chapter. The petition and procedures shall be the 
same as for the issuance of protective orders in the 
juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6, 
78-3a-20.7, 78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10. 
The court or the cohabitant may use the protections 
provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a, 
Juvenile Courts, and when necessary, those protec-
tions under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the 
Person, which provide for criminal prosecution. 
(2) A person who has obtained a protective order 
pursuant to this section shall notify any other court 
in which another action is pending or order is issued 
pertaining to the same family member named in the 
protective order.
 199l 
30-3-6. Repealed.
 1985 
30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and 
entered by the clerk in the register of actions if 
both the parties who have a child or children and 
the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial 
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the 
pilot program is administered and have com-
pleted attendance at the mandatory course pre 
vided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court 
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on 
the motion of one of the parties, upon determina-
tion that course attendance and completion are 
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the 
best interest of the parties; 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the 
court may specifically designate, unless an ap-
peal or other proceedings for review are pending; 
or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes 
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own mo-
tion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or ex-
tend a designated period of time before the decree 
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from 
the signing and entry of the decree. 1992 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful. 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dis-
solves their marriage by decree may marry any per-
son other than the spouse from whom the divorce was 
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is 
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affir-
mance of the decree. 1988 
30-3-9. Repea l ed . 1989 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regard-
ing the future custody, but the expressed desires are 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate. 1988 
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined. 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody": 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, 
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents, 
where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive author-
ity by the court to one parent to make specific 
decisions; 
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tating settlement of any or all issues in a domes-
tic relations case. Issues which cannot be agreed 
upon by the parties at the settlement conference 
shall be certified to the district court for trial; 
and 
(L) Conduct pretrial conferences with the par-
ties and their counsel on all domestic relations 
matters unless otherwise ordered by the presid-
ing judge. The commissioner shall make recom-
mendations on all issues under consideration at 
the pretrial and submit those recommendations 
to the district court. 
(3) Duties of Court Commissioner. Under the 
general supervision of the presiding judge, the court 
commissioner has the following duties prior to any 
domestic matter being heard by the district court: 
(A) Review all pleadings in each case; 
(B) Certify those cases directly to the district 
court that appear to require a hearing before the 
district court judge; 
(C) Except in cases previously certified to the 
district court, conduct hearings with parties and 
their counsel for the purpose of submitting rec-
ommendations to the parties and the court; 
(D) Coordinate information with the juvenile 
court regarding previous or pending proceedings 
involving children of the parties; and 
(E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation pro-
grams if available. 
(4) Objections. With the exception of pre-trial or-
ders, the commissioner's recommendation is the order 
of the court until modified by the court. Any party 
objecting to the recommended order, shall file a writ-
ten objection to the recommendation with the clerk of 
the court and serve copies on the commissioner's of-
fice and opposing counsel. Objections shall be filed 
within ten days of the date the recommendation was 
made in open court or if taken under advisement, ten 
days after the date of the subsequent written recom-
mendation made by the commissioner. Objections 
shall be to specific recommendations and shall set 
forth reasons for each objection. 
(5) Judicial review. Cases not resolved at the set-
tlement or pretrial conference shall be set for trial on 
all issues not resolved. All other matters shall be re-
viewed in accordance with Rule 4-501. 
(6) Prohibitions. 
(A) Commissioners shall not make final adju-
dications of domestic relations matters other 
than default or uncontested divorces and modifi-
cations. 
(B) Commissioners shall not serve as pro tem-
pore judges in any matter, except as provided by 
Rule of the Supreme Court. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 6-402. Repealed. 
Rule 6-403. Shortening 90-day waiting period in 
domestic matters. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for shortening or waiving 
the 90-day waiting period in domestic cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action 
shall not be heard by the district courts unless 90 
days have elapsed from the time the complaint was 
filed or unless the Court finds that there is good cause 
for shortening or eliminating the waiting period and 
enters a formal order to that effect prior to the hear-
ing date. 
(2) Application for a hearing less than 90 days 
from the date the complaint was filed shall be made 
by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting 
forth the factual matters constituting good cause. The 
motion and supporting affidavit(s) shall be served on 
the opposing party at least five days prior to the 
scheduled hearing unless the party is in default. 
(3) In the event the Court finds that there is good 
cause for hearing in less than 90 days from the filing 
of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause 
shall be included in the findings of fact and presented 
to the Court for signature. 
Rule 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish procedures for modification of existing 
divorce decrees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be 
commenced by the filing of a petition to modify in the 
original divorce action. Service of the petition and 
summons upon the opposing party shall be in accor-
dance with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a modifica-
tion of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an 
order to show cause. 
(2) The responding party shall serve the reply 
within twenty days after service of the petition. Ei-
ther party may file a certificate of readiness for trial. 
Upon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be re-
ferred to the domestic relations commissioner prior to 
trial, or in those districts where there is not a domes-
tic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calen-
dar. 
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a 
law and motion or order to show cause calendar with-
out the consent of the commissioner or the district 
judge. 
Rule 6-405. Repealed. 
Rule 6-406. Opening sealed adoption files. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform procedures for opening sealed 
adoption files and providing identifying information 
to adoptees and/or birth parents. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all district and juvenile 
courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All requests to open sealed adoption files to ob-
tain identifying information of adoptee or birth par-
ents shall be initiated by filing a formal petition with 
the clerk of the court in the county where the adop-
tion was granted. The petition must set forth in detail 
the reasons the information is desired and must be 
accompanied by a filing fee of $75.00. Neither a for-
mal petition nor a filing fee is required to obtain cer-
tified copies of the decree. 
(2) In cases where the petitioner is seeking specific 
medical information to aid in the preservation of the 
health of the petitioner, the petitioner must contact 
the Bureau of Vital Statistics and the adoption 
agency involved in the placement (if applicable) and 
make a request for all non-identifying information 
regarding the birth parents and other relatives. The 
petition must be accompanied by a letter from a li-
censed physician stating what the need is and 
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